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Deferred Compensation-The Phantom Stock Plan
Materializes
During the past few years a new incentive compensation plan has ar-
rived on the corporate scene to take its place alongside the more familiar
pension plans, bonuses, and stock options. This newcomer, the unit plan,
otherwise known as the "phantom stock" plan, has had few encounters
with the courts to date, but the results of these skirmishes have been
markedly different.
The purposes of this note are: to explain the mechanics of the unit
plan, to point out its consequences, and to discuss the issue of its validity.
MECHANICS OF THE PLAN
There are many variations of the unit plan, but typically it operates
as follows.' An administrative committee of directors, themselves ineli-
gible to participate in the plan, is created to award the units of the plan
to various key executives and employees. Each unit is assigned a "base
value" equivalent to the then current market value of one share of the
corporation's common stock. The plan places limits upon the number
of units which may be outstanding at any one time and the number which
may be assigned to any one individual. The number of a participant's
units are adjusted for stock dividends, stock splits, and other changes in
the corporate capital structure.
One feature of the plan is called the "dividend credit" provision.
Each assigned unit is credited with an amount equal to dividends paid
on one share of the corporation's common stock during the period com-
mencing with the participation of the particular employee and ending
with the termination of his employment? To qualify the participants
for compensation, termination of employment must be by death, retire-
ment at age 65, or retirement because of disability.
The other feature of the plan is the "market appreciation" provision.
In addition to the dividend credit, each unit is further credited with a
market appreciation item measured by the difference between its base
I. This description is based upon the unit plan of the Koppers Company. See Lieberman v.
Becker, 155 A.2d 596 (Del. 1959). For a complete draft of the plan, see RABKIN AND JOHN-
SON, 5 CuaREmr IGAL Fopas 784 (1958).
2. Under the unit plan of some corporations, the unit-holder has three choices as to how
he will receive his dividend credits. He may elect at the outset: (1) to have them accumulated
to his credit, (2) to have them paid directly to him, or (3) to have one-half paid directly to
him and one-half credited to his account. See Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 163 F. Supp. 78, 84
(N.D. Ohio 1958).
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value on the day it was assigned and the market price of the stock on the
day of death or retirement.' However, to protect the unit-holder against
a temporarily depressed market value, it is provided that he or his bene-
ficiary may elect to fix the terminating market price as of any date with-
in three years after the date of death or retirement. But in no case may
the market price on the selected value date exceed the highest market
price of the stock between the date of assignment of the unit and the date
of death or retirement.
4
Upon death or retirement, the total amount of deferred compensation
payable to the unit-holder or his beneficiary consists of the total of the
dividend credits and the market appreciation credited to his units. Such
deferred compensation then becomes payable over a period of ten years,
in quarterly installments.
In order to participate in the plan, an employee is required to agree
to remain in the corporation's employ for a period of five years, or until
retirement, to hold himself available for consultation for an additional
ten years after retirement, and not to compete with the corporation or to
become an employee of a competitor.'
As the assigned units are extinguished by death or retirement of the
unit-holders, comparable units then become available for reassignment
to other employees.
The board of directors sets aside a block of shares of the corporation's
unissued common stock as a reserve to support the plan, and for subse-
quent issue and sale if and when it becomes desirable to provide funds to
pay benefits under the plan.
The board of directors reserves the right to terminate the plan at any
time, and if the board elects to terminate within five years from its ef-
fective date, no credit under the market appreciation provision is made to
the account of any participant. Furthermore, the administrative com-
mittee can at any time prior to a participant's termination date reduce or
cancel all units standing to the credit of the participant, but cannot, by
so doing, affect the dividend credits already accrued.6
CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLAN
The unit plan is beneficial, both to the corporation and to the unit-
holder, in several respects.
3. In a closely-held corporation, the stock of which has no readily ascertainable market value,
the plan may be based upon increase in book value. See notes 56-58 infra and accompanying
text.
4. Under the plan of the Pittsburgh-Consolidation Coal Company, the optional-valuation
provision provided that the unit-holder could choose the retirement date or any date within
two years thereafter, provided that he notified the company at least ten days in advance of the
date selected. Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 163 F. Supp. 78, 87 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
5. These promises provide for the consideration passing to the corporation. See note 26 infra.
6. Lieberman v. Becker, 155 A.2d 596, 600 (Del. 1959).
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The plan gives the unit-holder a personal interest in the company
similar to that provided by stock ownership. It is apparent that the unit
plan bears a strong resemblance to the ordinary stock option plan. The
profits under a stock option plan and the amount of retirement benefits
under the phantom stock plan both depend largely upon the appreciation
of the market value of the stock. Therefore, both plans give the execu-
tive an incentive to do his best to help maximize profits and thus increase
the value of the stock.
However, the unit plan provides this ownership incentive with no
necessity of a capital outlay on the part of the unit-holder. This factor
makes the plan especially attractive to younger employees, who may be
financially unable to make an investment in the company's stock.
Through the unit plan, they have an opportunity for financial gain with-
out an investment
The plan is advantageous to the executive in another way - as a
method of hedging against inflation. In an inflationary economy, retire-
ment benefits determined by prior income represent a decreased purchas-
ing power. However, since there is some correlation between stock prices
and the cost of living,7 the unit plan may have a built-in adjustment to
the current cost of living, if the corporation's stock keeps pace with the
market.
Of advantage to the company is the fact that, whereas the executive
holding stock purchased under an option may sell his stock at any time
and realize his profit, a unit-holder must wait until retirement to realize
the benefit of any market appreciation. While a stock option plan ex-
hausts its incentive force once the stock has been sold, the unit plan pro-
vides incentive for the unit-holder until the day of his retirement.
The unit plan is particularly advantageous to a small, growth corpo-
ration, for it provides a method for such a company to defer a part of
the cost of hiring managerial talent until the corporation is in a stronger
financial position. Under the unit plan, unlike stock option plans that
involve early payment of dividends, the corporation retains the money
until the employee dies or retires, and pays no interest on it in the mean-
time.
To the shareholders, the phantom stock plan provides another advan-
tage over the stock option plan - they may avoid having their interests
diluted by the issuance of additional shares. If the corporation has suffi-
dent working capital at the time it is necessary to pay the death or retire-
ment benefits, it may pay them out of the cash then available. On the
other hand, if the company is short of cash, it can sell some of the un-
issued stock reserved for this contingency.
7. 1 P-H CORP. SERv. § 25,048 (1957).
19603
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
TAX ASPECTS OF THE PLAN
From a tax standpoint, the phantom stock plan is not as advantageous
either to the corporation or to the executive as the qualified pension plan,
under which the employer may take an immediate deduction for contribu-
tions and the employee is not currently taxed, but a qualified plan re-
quires a broad base of employees and no discrimination in favor of key
employees.' However, for tax purposes, the phantom stock plan provides
advantages over the nonqualified pension plan. If the rights under a
nonqualified plan are forfeitable, the employee is not currently taxed,
but the corporation may never take a deduction.' If the rights are non-
forfeitable, the corporation may take a current deduction, but the execu-
tive is presently taxed on the contributions.'"
The income tax consequences of the phantom stock plan appear to
be the same as those of other unfunded deferred compensation plans.
This means that the employee is not taxed until receipt of the payments,
unless he can be taxed under the doctrines of constructive receipt or eco-
nomic benefit." Therefore, there is no income to be reported at the time
when contingent credits are made to the account of a unit-holder." Since
taxation occurs only upon receipt of the payments, the taxable income to
the unit-holder will be postponed until a time when he will probably be
in a lower tax bracket.
Correspondingly, the corporation obtains a deduction in the year of
payment.'" The award of units merely creates a contingent liability to
make future payments. Since, at the outset, both the fact and the amount
of the liability are uncertain, no accrual can be made at that time. As
dividends are credited to unit-holders' accounts, ascertainable liabilities
may accrue, but no deduction can be taken for income tax purposes until
payment is made. 4
Since the payments to the unit-holder are income to him, it would
follow that they constitute income in respect of a decedent if received
by the beneficiaries or the estate of a deceased employee. 5
VALIDITY OF THE PLAN
The unit plan has been before the courts twice. In both cases share-
holders brought derivative actions to enjoin operation of the plan, con-
8. INT. RnV. CODE OF 1954, S 401.
9. TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 404(a).
10. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 403(b), 404(a) (5).
11. See Commissioner v. Oates, 207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953).
12. See Fillman, Ford Motor Company Employee Benefit Plans, N.Y.U. 17TH INST. ON FED.
TAx 883, 902-03 (1959).
13. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a) (5).
14. Shelmerdine, Shadow Stock Deferred Compensation Agreements, N.Y.U. 17TH INST. ON
FED. TAx 933, 946 (1959).
15. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 691.
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tending that it was a waste of corporate assets. In Berkwitz v. Hum-
phrey,'8 a United States district court determined that the phantom stock
plan of the Pittsburgh-Consolidation Coal Company was invalid and is-
sued an order restraining the corporation from issuing any further units
under the plan. But in Lieberman v. Becker,' the Supreme Court of
Delaware found the unit plan of the Koppers Company to be valid, re-
jecting the reasoning of the Berkwitz case. Since the plans in question
in the two cases were very similar, the variation between the decisions
requires a dose study of the reasoning in both, in order to guide the way
for future use of the unit plan.
There are two requirements for the validity of an incentive com-
pensation plan: (1) consideration, and (2) a reasonable relationship
between the value of the services rendered and the benefits granted to
the employees.'" The application of these two requirements to the unit
plan will be considered in detail.
Consideration
The first requirement for validity is that consideration pass from the
employee to the corporation.'" Several examples may be shown of con-
sideration held to be sufficient to support the granting of stock options.
One option was upheld upon a finding that the optionee was under an
employment contract.20  Another plan was upheld where the employees
agreed to remain in the service of the corporation for two years from
the date of the granting of the options.2 ' A third plan was upheld where
one year's service was to be performed prior to -the exercise of the
option.
2
On the other hand, mere creation of additional incentive in the em-
ployee is not sufficient consideration. 3 In one instance, an option plan
was enjoined because neither was the employee obligated to remain in
the company's employ, nor was the right to exercise the option made de-
pendent upon continued employment.24 Subsequently, an amended plan
requiring the optionee to remain in the company's employ for one year
16. 163 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
17. 155 A.2d 596 (Del. 1959).
18. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933); Wyles v. Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 343 (D. Del.
1948); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 283, 92 A.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
19. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 283, 92 A.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
20. Wyles v. Campbell, 77 F. Supp, 343 (D. Del. 1948).
21. Kaufman v. Shoenberg, 33 Del. Ch. 211, 91 A.2d 786 (Ch. 1952).
22. Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co., 23 N.J. Super. 431, 92 A.2d 862 (Ch. 1952).
23. See Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 82, 90 A.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1952);
Frankel v. Donovan, 120 A.2d 311 (Del. Ch. 1956).
24. Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 52 F. Supp. 125 (E. D. Pa. 1943).
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and preventing exercise of the option until one year after the issuance
was upheld.2"
The unit plan, as discussed previously, requires an agreement by the
employee to remain in the corporation's employ for five years, and also
other promises on his part.26 Therefore, the presence of sufficient con-
sideration seems clear, and even the court in Berkwitz v. Humphrey2 7 did
not dispute this.
Reasonable Relationship
The second requirement for the validity of the plan is that the value
given by the corporation bear a reasonable relationship to the value to be
received from the employee. Otherwise, the plan amounts to a gift of
corporate assets, which even a majority of the shareholders cannot make,
if the minority protests.2 ' To determine whether the unit plan complies
with this requirement, the dividend credit and market appreciation fea-
tures of the plan must be examined separately.
The dividend credit feature appears to cause little difficulty here.
Since dividends are related directly to earnings, they seem by nature to be
reasonably related to the efforts of the executives. In both the Berkwitz
case and the Lieberman case it was conceded by the plaintiffs that the in-
come of the company, upon which dividends are ultimately based, bears
a reasonable relationship to the value of the employee's services.29
It is the market appreciation provision which has cast doubt upon the
validity of the plan. In the Berkwitz case, the court had three objections
to the market appreciation feature.
First, the court said that there was no reasonable correlation between
the market price of the corporation's stock and the value of the unit-
holders' services. It reasoned that, although earnings affect the market
price, other factors totally unrelated to the value of the key executives'
services also have a substantial effect. Among these other factors the
court named: investor confidence, the general state of the economy, the
supply of stock available, the cost of money, inflation or deflation, and
the tendency of the market to discount the future."°
Apparently the court felt that it could sustain the validity of the
unit plan only if it could first hold "that an increase in the market value
of the stock is attributable solely to the extraordinary services rendered
25. Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 53 F. Supp. 488 (E. D. Pa. 1943).
26. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
27. 163 F. Supp. 78 (N. D. Ohio 1958).
28. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933); Wyles v. Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 343 (D. Del.
1948).
29. Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 163 F. Supp. 78, 89 (N. D. Ohio 1958); Lieberman v. Becker,
155 A.2d 596, 598 (Del. 1959).
30. Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 163 F. Supp. 78, 90 (N. D. Ohio 1958).
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by unit holders in response to the incentive of additional compensa-
tion." 1 (Emphasis added.)
But the validity of the plan should not rest upon this postulate. In-
centive compensation plans are based upon the assumption that better
personnel can be induced to come and remain with a company, and that
better results will ensue, if more attractive financial rewards are granted.
It is true that the market value of stock of a large corporation is deter-
mined to a large extent by the broad economic trends and other factors.
However, since earnings are the main factor in stock appreciation, ener-
getic, loyal management should, over a period of years, have an
appreciable impact upon the market price of a corporation's stock.
In the Lieberman case the court stated that fundamentally the plan is
similar to an ordinary stock option plan which is clearly valid;3" conse-
quently, the phantom stock plan should be upheld. The court pointed
out that the stock option plan, "based as it is upon a rise in the stock price
on the stock exchange, is equally subject to the vagaries of the market for
the realization by the employee of his reward."33  After comparing the
two plans, the court stated that:
If the acid test is a demonstrable relationship, then both types of plans,
we think, are subject to the same fatal flaw. On the other hand, if
one is a valid exercise of corporate power, by the same token, the other
is equally valid. 4
The second objection that the court in the Berkwitz case made to the
plan was in regard to the "optional value" provision, allowing the em-
ployee to pick a date within two years after termination of employment
to determine market appreciation. It held the provision to be unreason-
able per se, saying that:
Manifestly, any payment of an award resulting from an increase in
market value occurring after an employee has ceased working for the
corporation would be a gift and a clear misuse of corporate funds.35
But this provision seems justifiable as an attempt to compensate the
employee for the continuing value of his past services to a going business
and also as a method of protecting him from the vagaries of the stock
market. It is similar to a provision in a stock option plan which allows
exercise of the option within a limited period after termination of em-
ployment.
The third objection in the Berkwitz case was that the absence of any
31. Id.at 91.
32. See FLETcHER, CORPORATONs § 2143.1 (Supp. 1959); DEL. CODE ANN. nit. 8, § 157
(Supp. 1958).
33. Lieberman v. Becker, 155 A.2d 596, 600 (Del. 1959).
34. Ibid.
35. Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 163 F. Supp. 78, 93 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
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limitation on the amount a unit-holder could receive meant that the
corporation might become obligated to pay "grossly disproportionate"
benefits.86 This point was also raised in the Lieberman case but was re-
jected for several reasons.
One reason for rejecting the contention was that the plan in question
did provide checks upon this liability. There were the reservations per-
mitting the board of directors to terminate the plan and the administra-
tive committee to reduce or cancel all units standing to the credit of the
participant."
The court noted that a further limitation upon the liability of the
company existed in the setting aside of a substantial block of unissued
shares of stock, as a reserve against the company's obligation under the
plan. This meant that if there were a large rise in market price, impos-
ing an unexpected liability on the corporation to meet its obligations un-
der the plan, the company could sell in the open market a sufficient num-
ber of such shares to satisfy the requirements of the plan."
Finally, the court commented that, even if potentially unlimited
liability did exist, "such a reason would not seem to be sufficient in any
event to strike down a plan of compensation at the time of its institu-
tion." 9  The court stated that:
... in the event matters got out of hand, the courts undoubtedly could
prevent the waste of corporate assets if the actual amounts to be paid
under the plan became so large as to be wholly unreasonable.40
This type of language is in line with the "business judgment rule,"
whereby courts defer to the honest judgment of the directors on questions
of corporate management and policy.41 In shareholder derivative suits,
the courts usually require the shareholder attacking a plan to show that
the excessive compensation stems from fraud or bad faith practiced by
the directors.42 Furthermore, even the landmark case in the incentive
compensation area, Rogers v. Hill,4" held merely that the amount paid
was unreasonable, not that the plan by which the figure had been com-
puted was unreasonable.
Although the opinion in the Berkwitz case ignored the business judg-
ment rule, the court in the Lieberman case followed that rule stating:
36. Id. at 91.
37. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
38. Lieberman v. Becker, 155 A.2d 596, 600 (Del. 1959).
39. Id. at 601.
40. Ibid.
41. Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 61 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Pa. 1945); Ellerman v. Chicago
Junction Ry., 49 N.J. Eq. 217 (Ch. 1891).
42. Heinz v. National Bank of Commerce, 237 Fed. 942 (8th Cir. 1916); Gottfried v. Gott-
fried, 112 N.Y.S. 2d 431 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
43. 289 U.S. 582 (1933).
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In any event, whether or not a corporation should embark upon such a
method of compensating its employees is to be decided by the board of
directors in the exercise of their business judgment.44
Reasonableness for Tax Purposes
The preceding discussion, although dealing with the question of rea-
sonableness as against shareholder attack on the plan, is of equal im-
portance for income tax purposes. Since a corporation is allowed to take
a deduction only for "a reasonable allowance for salaries or other com-
pensation for personal services actually rendered,"45 the Internal Revenue
Service will inquire into the reasonableness of this type of incentive com-
pensation.4' The same type of analysis will be applied as in the share-
holder's suit.
ADOPTION OF THE PLAN
If a corporation decides to adopt the unit plan, the question arises as
to the best method for so doing. In Ohio, the board of directors is em-
powered to adopt a stock option plan without submitting the matter to
the shareholders4 However, until the doubts caused by the Berkwitz
case as to the validity of the unit plan are resolved, it is advisable for the
directors to approve the plan and then have it ratified by the shareholders.
Shareholder approval will not render a gift or a waste of corporate
assets valid, unless perhaps the vote is unanimous.4' However, it has
been held that, even in a waste situation, such approval creates a pre-
sumption of regularity."9 Shareholder ratification renders a simple "in-
terested director" transaction valid,"° and also has the effect of shifting
the burden of proof from the interested director to the attacking share-
holder.5
For shareholder approval to be effective, there must be fall and com-
plete disclosure to the shareholders. 2 In this regard, some courts may
construe the requirement of notice and explanation more strictly than
others."3
44. Lieberman v. Becker, 155 A.2d 596, 601 (Del. 1959).
45. INT. R1v. CoIn oF 1954, § 162(a) (1).
46. See Patton v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1948); Rogers Inc. v. United States,
93 F. Supp. 1014 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
47. 010O REv. CODE § 1701.17.
48. Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
49. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933).
50. Chambers v. Beaver-Advance Corp., 392 Pa. 481, 140 A.2d 808 (1958); Frey v. Geuder,
Paeschke & Frey Co., 4 Wis. 2d 257, 90 N.W.2d 765 (1958).
51. Kaufman v. Shoenberg, 33 Del. Ch. 211, 91 A.2d 786 (Ch. 1952).
52. Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. 1952);
Gerlach v. Gillam, 139 A.2d 591 (Del. Ch. 1958).
53. Compare Frey v. Geuder, Paeschke & Frey Co., 4 Wis. 2d 257, 90 N.W.2d 765 (1958)
with Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co., 23 N.J. Super. 431, 92 A.2d 862 (Ch. 1952).
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In the Berkwitz case, the defendants contended that, even if the plan
had been of questionable validity when adopted, it had been effectively
ratified by the shareholders. However, the court held that there had
been no ratification because the proxy statement had said that the purpose
of the vote was to authorize the setting aside of shares in connection with
the unit plan, and, thus, the shareholders had not approved the plan
itself.54 But in the Lieberman case the shareholders had expressly ap-
proved adoption of the plan.55
The lesson is dear. All of the details of the plan should be revealed
to the shareholders and they should expressly approve the plan.
ALTERNATIVE PLANS
A number of other plans exist which are similar to the type of phan-
tom stock plan discussed previously. Because there is at least a doubt
as to the validity of the market appreciation feature, in light of the Berk-
witz decision, and because a particular corporation may find one of the
alternative plans more suitable to its individual needs, it seems appropriate
to discuss several of the plans briefly.
The Heinz Plan
In the Berkwitz case, the court mentioned that the plan in question
had been patterned after a similar one adopted by the H. J. Heinz Com-
pany, but that the Heinz plan differed significantly in that the benefits
were based upon increased book value of the company's shares, rather
than upon appreciation in the market value. The court suggested that
such a plan based upon increased book value, properly computed, would
be valid.56
Indeed, the book value plan seems dearly to avoid the objections
which the court in the Berkwitz case found with respect to the market
appreciation feature. The benefits under the book value plan must
bear a reasonable relationship to services, because (1) earnings are ad-
mittedly related to the services rendered, and (2) if management with-
holds distribution of dividends, those earnings which are not distributed
remain in the corporation as an addition to net assets, thus increasing the
book value of the stock. Also, the method provides more stability, since
book value is not subject to the rapid fluctuations of market value.
However, the accountant's book value may not always be an accurate
indication of a corporation's true, intrinsic worth, since recognized ac-
counting practice does not allow the writing up of assets to reflect appre-
54. Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 163 F. Supp. 78, 94 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
55. Lieberman v. Becker, 155 A.2d 596, 597 (Del. 1959).
56. Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 163 F. Supp. 78, 94 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
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ciation in market value.57 This conservatism would seem to make the
plan less attractive to the employee. In the Heinz plan, great care was
taken in defining book value and provision was made for adjustments to
exclude unusual and non-recurring items which would not reflect the true
appreciation in the value of the company.5"
Use of the book value feature provides a method for adapting the
phantom stock plan to smaller, closely-held corporations, the stock of
which has no readily ascertainable market value. The phantom stock
plan is an especially useful incentive system for closely-held corporations,
since the incentive of stock ownership can be provided to key employees
without the necessity of admitting minority shareholders.
Stock Held by Corporation
Another plan provides for a bonus to be granted to the employee in
the form of a number of shares of stock which are actually held by the
corporation until the employee's retirement, with dividends to be paid to
him in the meantime.59 It has been argued that such a plan is superior
to the phantom stock plan because the only cost to the corporation is the
original value of the shares when they are awarded, as contrasted with the
phantom stock plan, in which the final market appreciation benefits come
from the corporation's treasury."0
However, it seems that in fact the phantom stock plan may be less
costly to the corporation than one in which actual stock is delivered, for
two reasons. First, the "dividends" paid or credited to unit-holders are
charged off as operating expenses when paid, and come out of gross in-
come before taxes, not as in the case of actual dividends, out of net
income after taxes. Second, when the corporation finally pays the
deferred compensation, either out of its treasury or by sale of the unissued
stock, it pays only the difference between the original value and the final
amount.
The Du Pont Plan
The Du Pont Corporation has adopted a plan which combines the
features of the unit plan and the stock option. The executive is granted
a certain number of units, accompanied by stock options. Each unit en-
titles him to receive an amount equivalent to the dividends paid on a
57. AMmcAN AccoUNTING ASSOCIATION, AccOUNTING AND REPORTING STANDARDS
FOR CORPORATE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND PRECEDING STATEMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTS
23 (1957). Cf. Randall v. Bailey, 288 N.Y. 280, 43 N.E.2d 43 (1942).
58. Shelmardine, Shadow Stock Deferred Compensation Agreements, N.Y.U. 17TH INST. ON
FED. TAx 933, 947 (1959).
59. Business Week, May 31, 1958, p. 53.
60. Ibd.
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share of common stock until his death or his eighty-fifth year, whichever
comes later. Under this plan there is no market appreciation feature. As
the accompanying options are exercised, the dividend units are reduced
proportionately.6 Thus, if the executive wishes to gain the benefits of
any market appreciation he must make an investment, but even if he
chooses not to exercise his options he still has additional income for him-
self or his estate. Since there is apparently no objection either to extra
compensation based upon annual dividends or to stock options, this plan,
combining the two, seems dearly valid.
CONCLUSION
The phantom stock plan is a novel innovation which bears examina-
tion by corporations both large and small. Although the issue of its
validity has not been clearly resolved, the indications are that the plan is
valid. Berkwitz v. Humphrey,"2 a lower court case, was never appealed.
Its reasoning was rejected by the Supreme Court of Delaware in Lieber-
man v. Becker, 3 in a decision based upon sounder reasoning. The court
in the prior case seemed to feel that there was a total lack of precedent to
guide it, as evidenced by its statement that "diligent research by counsel
and the court has failed to reveal any reported decision that is even remotely
analogous on its facts."64  However, it ignored the basic similarity be-
tween the phantom stock plan and the ordinary stock option plan, the
validity of which is firmly established. Both plans are designed to meet
the same objective, and the phantom stock plan may be a more effective
means of obtaining the objective for some corporations. Its use should
increase as the years pass.
JAMES A. AMDUR
The Abortion Law
A young pregnant housewife is told by doctors that there is a pre-
dictable chance that her child will be born physically deformed.
A grandmother with heart disease and entering "change of life" finds
that she is pregnant.
A thirteen-year-old rape victim learns that she is going to have a baby.
An emotionally disturbed socialite wife threatens suicide if she is
forced to go through with her first pregnancy.'
61. Cox, Aspects of the duPont Bonus Program, N.Y.U. 17TH INST. ON FED. TAX 905,913-15
(1959).
62. 163 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
63. 155 A.2d 596 (Del. 1959).
64. Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 163 F. Supp. 78, 88 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
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If one proceeds from the premise that each of these women desires
an abortion, two questions are immediately presented: First, is abortion in
such cases medically, humanely, eugenically or socially justifiable? Sec-
ond, and more important, if it is assumed that the abortion can be justi-
fied on one or a combination of the above grounds, would the perform-
ance of such an abortion be legal under the existing laws?
Each of the above cases was decided by doctors on "medical"
grounds. The grandmother and the socialite received abortions; the
other two did not. But, in other cases, with exactly the same circum-
stances, the results have been the opposite. In America, decisions on
abortions vary from doctor to doctor and from hospital to hospital.2
This confusion and inconsistency present in the field of "legal" abor-
tion has resulted mainly from the status of the law on the subject, and
has created problems for the prospective mother, the medical profession,
and the nationwide community.
THE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
Since there is no federal abortion law in the United States, each state
has been free to legislate independently on the subject. However, no
state has enacted a law defining legal abortion, and, therefore, in order
to discover what abortions may be performed within the law, it is neces-
sary to look to the exceptions provided for in the criminal abortion
statutes.
The prevailing view in this country is that abortion is illegal unless
necessary to preserve the life of the mother.' There are only six jurisdic-
tions today which provide for abortion to preserve the mother's health,
as distinguished from saving her life.4 Therefore, the general pre-
requisite for lawfully performing an abortion (the expulsion or bringing
forth of the fetus before it has reached such a stage of development so
as to be capable of living) 5 is that it be necessary to save the life of the
mother.
It is fairly obvious that such provision is quite narrow in scope, and
ignores many situations that would perhaps justify an abortion.
1. Sontheimer, Abortion in America Today, Woman's Home Companion, Oct. 1955, p. 44.
2. Ibid.
3. Louisiana is the only state which provides no basis for justifying abortion. See Morrow,
The Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942 - Opportunities Lost and Challenges Yet Unanswered,
17 TUL. v. 1, 21 (1942).
4. Alabama, Colorado, District of Columbia, Maryland, New Mexico, Oregon. For a full
statement of the statutory provisions of each state see Harper, Abortion Laws in the United
States, ABORTION IN THE UNIrED STATEs, Appendix A (Calderone ed. 1958).
5. 1 AM. JuR. Abortion § 2 (1940).
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ENGLISH v. AMERICAN VIEW
The leading English case of Rex v. Bourne shows how much further
British courts have been willing to go in allowing therapeutic abortion
under a "preserving life" statute. The case involved the prosecution of a
doctor for aborting a fourteen-year-old rape victim. The court stated
in the charge that there was no clear line of distinction between danger
to life and danger to health, and that impairment of the latter might
reach the stage where it was a danger to life. Therefore, the court said,
the preservation of life is not to be limited to the peril of instant death;
rather, if the probable consequence of the continuance of the pregnancy
would be to make the girl a "physical or mental wreck," the jury could
find justification for the abortion. (Mr. Bourne was acquitted.)
It appears, therefore, that in England, under the same type of statute
that is prevalent in the United States, the view is that the termination of
pregnancy is justified when it is carried out by a doctor in the honest be-
lief, on reasonable grounds, that the continuance of the pregnancy will
endanger the life or cause serious injury to the physical or mental health
of the mother.
In the United States, the more recent leading cases on abortion show
that the general tendency on the part of the courts is to interpret the
abortion statutes liberally.
In State v. Dunkelbarger7 it was held that the danger which justifies
abortion need not be "imminent," but is sufficient if it is "potentially
present," nor is it essential that the doctor believe that the death of the pa-
tient be otherwise certain. The case involved a fifteen-year-old girl who
was aborted by the defendant after the girl had used instruments on her-
self and had jumped several times from a height of eight or ten feet in
what the court may have regarded as suicide attempts, but more likely
were crude efforts at self-abortion. Since the Iowa statute read that the
abortion is illegal "unless such miscarriage be necessary to save her life,"'
the court's decision to acquit the doctor seems to be an instance of judicial
straining to accommodate excessively strict abortion law to the "spirit of
the times."'
6. [1939] 1 K.B. 687. The case involved the rape of a fourteen-year-old girl who subse-
quently found herself pregnant. Mr. Bourne, a prominent English physician, aborted her and
promptly invited prosecution, making this a "test case." Bourne alleged that, in his opinion,
even if the girl had not died in the approaching confinement, it probably would have made her
a physical and mental wreck. The jury acquitted him and in the charge by McNaughten, J.,
the English view was stated that life and health cannot be separated and that the law was not
concerned only with instant death. See Rex v. Bergmann & Ferguson, Central Criminal Court
(May, 1948), which held that where mental breakdowns would result if pregnancy were al-
lowed to continue, an abortion may be performed.
7. 206 Iowa 971, 221 N.W. 592 (1928).
8. IOWA CODE § 12973 (1927) (now IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.1 (1950)).
9. Guttmacher, The Legal Status of Therapeutic Abortion, THERAPEuTIc ABoRTIoN 175,
183 (Rosen ed. 1954).
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Another noteworthy American case is Commonwealth v. Wheeler,"0
where the court, while affirming the defendant physician's conviction,
stated that "a physician may lawfully procure the abortion of a patient if,
in good faith, he believes it necessary to save her life or to prevent serious
impairment of her health, mental or physical," and if his judgment cor-
responds with the general opinion "of competent practitioners in the
community in which he practices."'"
However, it is also true that many courts do not take a liberal view,
but hold that the destruction of an unborn life for reasons, whatever they
may be, other than the necessity to save the mother's life, is prohibited. "
Furthermore, the general view has been that evidence of the prior good
health of the woman is sufficient, in the absence of evidence of necessity,
to sustain a finding of non-necessity of the abortion to preserve life. 3
THE RESULTS OF THE UNITED STATES LAW
The Doctor's Dilemma
The repressive view that the American law has taken toward
abortion has resulted in appalling consequences. As one learned medical
man has stated:
When a law is such that a great profession is required, on humanitarian
grounds, to repeatedly break this law, and when enforcement agencies
recognize the law's inadequacy by failing to prosecute flagrant infractions
thereof, then it is high time that something be done about it. 4
This same author goes on to state that one must wonder about the wisdom
of a law when it is frequently seen that a strict compliance with it results
in the death of both the mother and the fetus, when the mother might
have been saved."
10. 315 Mass. 394, 53 N.E.2d 4 (1944), where the defendant physician, without consulta-
tion, secretly aborted his wife in his own office, because "she had suffered a neurosis for
years." But see State v. Brandenburg, 137 N.J.L. 124, 58 A.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. 1948), affirm-
ing conviction of a licensed physician, where trial judge had declined to charge that protection
of the health or well-being of the woman could constitute lawful justification. The appellate
court found no substantial support for a justification based on "well-being," and refused to con-
sider whether the statute allowed abortion to preserve health, since the defense was removal of
a dead fetus to save the woman's life.
11. Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 315 Mass. 394, 53 N.E.2d 4, 6 (1944).
12. State v. Tippie, 89 Ohio St. 35, 105 N.E. 75 (1913) held that the Ohio statute covers
any case of the premature removal or expulsion of the fetus, whether living or dead, with
other intent than to preserve the mother's life. See also State v. Rudman, 126 Me. 177, 136 A.
817 (1927).
13. Fitch v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 748, 165 S.W.2d 558 (1942); State v. Fitzgerald, 174
S.W.2d 211 (Mo. 1943). Annor., 153 A.L.R. 1266 (1944).
14. Address by Roy E. Fallas, M.D., President of Pacific Coast Obstetrical and Gynecological
Society, June 1952, in 60 WESTRN J. OF SURGERY, OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 259, 260
(1952).
15. Id. at 261.
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One result of the law in its present status is the perilous and uncertain
position in which it places the doctor. Although it is dear that an
abortion may be legally performed if it is necessary to preserve the life
of the mother, the question which the doctor must decide is: what is life
for the purposes of the abortion laws? Does "life" connote the ability to
continue normal physical and mental activity, or is the meaning of the
word to be so construed that abortion would be illegal if performed to
protect that life from existence at a vegetative level?16 The law has done
little to answer this question.
The exceptions found in the statutes are of little aid to the legitimate
doctor in deciding whether or not, in a given case, he may abort his
patient. 7 Not only are these statutes narrow in scope, but moreover,
judicial interpretation of them is meager. (The latter factor stems from
the lack of prosecutions for abortion in the United States and the fact that
most of the prosecutions that do take place are defended on the ground of
denial of the act rather than of the necessity for it.)
Physical Health
This dilemma can best be illustrated by a sample case.' 8 Suppose a
doctor is faced with an abortion request by a twenty-two-year-old severe
cardiac patient. Two years previously she had had a baby, but through-
out the pregnancy she was forced to remain bedridden. Her request can
be analyzed from two points of view. (1) The patient was carried safely
through pregnancy two years before and there is a good likelihood that
this can be done again. Even though it is true that she will be forced
to remain in bed throughout virtually her entire pregnancy and will be
unable to take care of her child and family, nevertheless a second child
is unlikely to cause her premature death. (2) It can be argued that hers
is a valuable life. She already has a two-year-old child to whom she owes
motherly duties and a husband to whom she owes wifely duties. Is it
fair to compel her to give these up for nine months? Furthermore, with
the severe heart disease she has, her life expectancy is short and will most
likely be shortened still further by the necessity of caring for two in-
fants instead of one. It may be concluded that upon ethical grounds a
hospital would be justified in either aborting or not aborting her, the
decision depending upon which of the above views is taken.
This problem becomes even more acute when economic and social
factors are added. Would it affect the decision if the girl lived in an
old walk-up apartment and had to do all her own work, in contrast to a
16. REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAw, 322 (3d ed. 1956).
17. Ibid.
18. Guttmacher, Therapeutic Abortion: The Doctor's Dilemma, 21 JOURNAL OF MoUNT
SINAI HOSPrrAL 111 (1954).
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situation where she resided in a plush home with an abundance of do-
mestic and financial help?
In theory, under the law today, the only justification for therapeutic
abortion is on "medical" grounds. Therefore, in the above case, the only
question to be decided would be whether an abortion is necessary to pre-
serve this woman's life. In practice, however, few decisions on abortion
are decided solely on medical grounds. This leads to two opposite re-
sults. On the one hand many doctors refuse to perform an abortion, even
when they feel it justified, for fear of prosecution and because they are
unsure of the protection that the law affords them." Many of these
doctors will instead send "worthy" patients to known abortionists. In
direct opposition to this (and by far the more frequent result) is the per-
formance by doctors and hospitals of numerous "illegal" abortions. It has
been stated that:
The truly legal abortions, in which the procedure is absolutely essen-
tial to preserve the woman's life are relatively few. If one should apply
this yardstick, and this yardstick alone to each case, it is unlikely that
more than one abortion in five hundred or one thousand pregnancies
is technically legal.20
In commenting on this problem, the late Dr. Frederick J. Taussig,
America's foremost authority on abortion, said that:
If therapeutic abortion were limited to those cases where the life of the
mother was certainly and immediately imperiled, the number of such
abortions would be exceedingly small, and unfortunately they would in
many instances be done too late to save her life. ... The medical pro-
fession has, as a rule, paid but little attention to what was written in
the statute books....
Mental Health
In recent years the importance of the psychiatric necessity for abor-
tion has increased. However, the fear of the law has been a strong de-
termining factor in the policy adopted by hospitals and physicians in
granting abortions on psychiatric grounds. 2 Since the law states that
abortion can only be performed in order to save or preserve the mother's
life, one widely-held view that has resulted is that the only legally valid
psychiatric reason for terminating pregnancy is the danger of suicide.23
19. WLLIAMs, THE SANcnTY OF DIFE AND THm CRIMINAL LAw 188 (1957). (Herein-
after cited as WILLmMS).
20. Guttmacher, Therapeutic Abortion: The Doctor's Dilemma, 21 JoURJINAL OF MOUNT
SNAI HOsPITAL 111, 119 (1954).
21. As quoted in Sontheimer, Abortion in America Today, Woman's Home Companion,
Oct. 1955, p. 44.
22. WILLumIS 168.
23. McGraw, Legal Aspects of Termination of Pregnancy on Psychiatric Grounds, 56 N.Y. ST.
J. MED. 1605 (1956). But see Hatchard v. State, 79 Wis. 357, 48 N.W. 380 (1891), where
the court held that the defense of necessity was not available if the abortion was procured to
prevent the mother from committing suicide.
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However, even this narrow interpretation is replete with its problems.
When a woman threatens suicide unless her pregnancy is terminated, it
is difficult to segregate the factor of "illness" from such rational and
social elements as her desire to avoid disgrace, or excessive childbearing,
or loss of job. These latter considerations are, of course, no basis for
"legal" abortion. In reality, psychiatric justifications for abortion are
hard to isolate and psychiatrists themselves find it difficult, if not impos-
sible, to distinguish between medical and social justification.24 The result
is that even when the psychiatrist advises an abortion, the surgeon often
refuses simply because he is unsure of whether the decision was based on
sound medical grounds, and thereby complies with the law.
Should the Medical Profession Be Forced to
Pay Little Attention to the Law?
In principle there seems to be no sound reason why the justification
for abortion should not be extended to cases where the pregnancy is to
be terminated for the purpose of preventing serious injury to the mother,
even though that injury is not of such a character as to affect the dura-
tion of her life. The mother's life must be considered in relation to its
quality as well as to its duration. Serious physical or mental injury to
the mother, who is a human being capable of pain and suffering, is a
great evil and should be avoided.2" There is as yet little judicial guidance
on the question whether the quality of the life is regarded under statutes
referring merely to the preservation of the life of the mother. "It would
certainly be a grave thing to hold that operations to preserve the mother's
health (as distinct from life) are illegal, when these operations are al-
ready performed by the medical profession with beneficial results."2 In
reality, one finds that most therapeutic abortions are actually granted be-
cause of socioeconomic and humanitarian reasons that are masked as
psychiatric or other medical reasons.27
The problem that the law has created for doctors by allowing abor-
tion only on "medical" grounds is further complicated by the recent ad-
vance of medicine in reducing the number of situations where abortion
is necessitated by physical conditions of the mother.2 In fact, the number
of cases where the operation is needed to save the mother from impend-
24. Lidz, Reflections of a Psychiatrist, THERAPEUTIC ABORTION 277-83, (Rosen ed. 1954);
ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 7 (Calderone ed. 1958).
25. WILLIAMS 163-64.
26. Id. at 165.
27. ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES 175 (Calderone ed. 1958).
28. Guttmacher, The Shrinking Non-Psychiatric Indications for Therapeutic Abortion,
THERAPEUTIC ABORTION 12 (Rosen ed. 1954).
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ing death has dwindled almost to insignificance.29 It is dear, therefore,
that only if the physician is allowed to provide against a probable short-
ening of the expected span of life, and for this purpose is allowed to take
into account psychological, family, and social factors, will therapeutic
abortion become more useful and generally applicable.
AREAS THE LAw DiSREGARDS
As the situation now stands, the legal justification for abortion fails
to encompass many areas which appear to need the sanction of the law.
Abortion is not justified on the ethical ground that the mother was raped
or that the intercourse was obtained by threat or fraud; or on the eugenic
ground that the father or mother is feeble-minded or affected with a trans-
missible disease; or that the pregnancy resulted from an incestuous act;
or on the economic ground that the parents cannot support another child;
or on the ground that the mother is unmarried and will be forced to give
up her job and will be socially disgraced; or on the ground that the fetus
is already dead.!'
However, it should be pointed out that some of these considerations
may (and often do) enter indirectly by giving rise to the physician's be-
lief that it would be injurious to the mother to allow her to give birth to
the child. In particular, severe worry about the consequences of having
the child may greatly affect the mother's mental health, thereby per-
mitting the abortion."'
Removal of the Dead Fetus
The general view of the American courts has been to interpret the
usual abortion statutes as prohibiting the removal of the dead fetus from
the mother. 2 The social reason for this interpretation is that it enables
the lay abortionist to be convicted, because it deprives him of the defense
that the fetus was already dead when he performed the operation. This
interpretation, which does have some social justification, "certainly repre-
sents a perversion of the historical intention underlying the abortion leg-
islation which was passed for the protection of the unborn child and not
29. Severe and advanced degrees of cardio-vascular-renal disease in pregnancy; some other
serious cases of cardiac disease; an occasional case of disease of the primary urinary tract with
renal decomposition constitute almost the total of cases on which there is still general medical
agreement that the operation is needed for pressing medical reasons of a physical nature.
WILLIAsNS 167.
30. Id. at 171-72.
31. Id. at 172.
32. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 665, 58 S.B2d 72 (1950); State v. Cox, 197
Wash. 67, 84 P.2d 357 (1938); Wilbanks v. State, 41 Ga. App. 268, 152 SE. 619 (1930);
Commonwealth v. Nason, 252 Mass. 545, 148 N.E. 110 (1925); State v. Tippie, 89 Ohio St.
35, 105 N.E. 75 (1913). See Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 949 (1951).
19603 NOTES
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [
as a form of control of unregistered medical practitioners."3  It is con-
ceivable that under such an interpretation, a woman could be forced to
carry a dead fetus for an extended period of time; a situation which may
well have a lasting mental effect.
Eugenic Considerations
Current American legislation does not provide for abortion where
the child is likely to suffer from a serious defect, either because of inheri-
tance from one or both of his parents or because of some disease con-
tracted by his mother during pregnancy. It seems, however, that the
breeding of defectives is an evil and should be avoided if possible. In
fact, even though they are "illegal," such operations are regularly per-
formed by responsible physicians throughout the country.34 These doc-
tors justify their eugenic abortions by stating that they are preventing
the mother from developing a psychosis.3 5 Typical cases where this is
done (illegally) are where the mother contracts German measles
(rubella) during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy, where the mother
has deep X-ray treatments to which the fetus is exposed, " or where the
child is likely to be born with a hereditary disease (e.g., idiocy, insanity,
epilepsy, nervous diseases, eye diseases leading to blindness)." In the
first instance, thirty per cent of the offspring are born with serious ab-
normalities; in the second, two-thirds of the offspring can be expected
to have gravely defective central nervous systems.3" Not only would
abortion in such cases relieve society's burden and preclude a life of
misery for the child, but the prospective birth of a seriously defective
child may constitute a real threat to the mental and physical health of
the mother.
Rape and Incest
It is difficult to see how a law can be supported that compels a girl
to carry and give birth to a child conceived by her through an act of
violence. Yet, that is the result of the present abortion law in the United
States. It has been stated that:
33. WILLIAMS 191.
34. See Sontheimer, Abortion in America Today, Women's Home Companion, Oct. 1955,
p. 44.
35. Guttmacher, in THERAPEuTIc ABORTION 183 (Rosen ed. 1954) quoting Studdiford.
He further states: "This is certainly an acceptable scientific rationalization for a socially neces-
sary procedure." Ibid.
36. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). (Hereinafter
cited as MODEL CODE.)
37. TAussiG, ABORTION, SPONTANEOUS AND INDUCED 318 (1936).
38. MODEL CODE § 207.11.
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There can be few doctors, and even members of the general public, who
do not feel it an anomaly that pregnancies, the result of positively illegal
acts - e.g. rape or seduction of a girl below the age of consent - can-
not be terminated, if the demand is made, upon that ground alone.39
Nevertheless, many instances of strict compliance with the law have been
reported.
Dr. Fred L. Adair reported that a juvenile court judge sent him a
young teen-ager, raped and pregnant, for an abortion. "I sent her back
and said if he would give me legal permission, I would be very happy to
do it. He said he could not do it. In other words, I could commit an
illegal act and he could not."4
Dr. M. S. Guttmacher tells of a twelve-year-old child who was im-
pregnated by her father. After the latter had been convicted of the of-
fense, Dr. Guttmacher told the youngster that, "Something will surely
be done about it."'" Johns Hopkins Hospital agreed to perform the oper-
ation if a letter could be obtained from a judge authorizing the opera-
tion. Each judge approached expressed his concern and his inability to
act. Guttmacher says, "The hurt look in the eyes of that spindly-legged
child, when she was told that there was no help available to her, is a
haunting memory."'
It would seem doubtful that there would be any strong moral oppo-
sition to the aborting of a fetus conceived by forcible rape, and it is evi-
dent from the dearth of reported American prosecutions that abortion
under these circumstances is not considered an anti-social act.4" As for
incest, this is usually committed upon adolescent girls, and the case here
for abortion seems as strong as, if not stronger than, the case for abortion
on other grounds, since there is some basis for believing that close in-
breeding involves some chance of producing defective offspring. Fur-
thermore, in the case of incestuous conception, there is no possibility that
the offspring can be legitimatized by marriage of the parents.
Social Grounds
As previously stated, social and/or economic considerations are never
considered as grounds for justifiable abortion. However, these socioeco-
nomic factors deserve consideration due to the fact that the majority
39. Letter from Chesser to the editors of BRMSH MEDICAL JOURNAL in I BRI sH MEDICAL
JOURNAL 728 (1949).
40. As reported in Sontheimer, Abortion in America Today, Woman's Home Companion,
Oct. 1955, p. 44.
41. Guttmacher, The Legal Status of Therapeutic Abortion, THERAPEUTIC ABORTION 185
(Rosen ed. 1954).
42. Ibid.
43. MODEL CODE § 207.11, comment at 154.
44. Id. at 155.
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(estimated at ninety per cent) of all criminal abortions are performed
on married women who seek to avoid the economic burden of another
child.45
Innumerable instances of such socioeconomic grounds can be set
forth, e.g., pregnancy of a deserted wife, pregnancy of a woman who is
the working member of a family supporting a dependent husband or
other children, pregnancy of a woman inmate of a prison,46 none of
which are sanctioned by the law.
INCIDENCE AND EFFECT OF CRIMINAL ABORTION
The clear result of the repressive abortion law in the United States
has not been to eliminate abortion, but instead to drive it into the most
undesirable channels, i.e., (1) into the hands of professional abortionists,
and (2) to lead women to resort to self-induced abortion attempts.47 Esti-
mates of the yearly number of abortions have been put as high as
2,000,000, of which the proportion of illegal abortions has been placed
at anywhere from thirty per cent to seventy per cent.4" A conservative
estimate of the criminal abortions is 330,000 - roughly 1,000 per day.49
More than half the illegal abortions are performed by physicians, one-
fifth by midwives and about one-fourth by the mother."0
A woman thwarted in her attempt to obtain a legal abortion will often
turn to the abortionist who, more often than not, operates without medi-
cal training and under unsanitary conditions."1 These abortionists are
widespread throughout the country, operating in various manners and
catering to different classes of women.52 Some abortion rings are ex-
tremely well-organized, turning out a fantastic number of abortions per
week." Indeed, it has been stated that the abortionist is a necessary
social institution, a theory supported by the number operating and in de-
mand, and by the fact that many doctors refer women to known abor-
tionists. 4
45. Id. at 149; TAUSSIG, ABORTION, SPONTANEOUS AND INDUCED, ch. 23, 24 (1936).
46. MODEL CODE § 207.11, comment at 156.
47. WILLIAMS 212.
48. MODEL CODE § 207.11, comment at 147.
49. Sontheimer, Abortion in America Today, Woman's Home Companion, Oct. 1955, p. 44;
WILLaIS 209. John H. Amen has estimated that a total of more than 100,000 criminal
abortions were performed in New York City alone during the three-year period 1936-39. Ibid.
50. TAuSSIG, ABORTION, SPONTANEOUS AND INDUCED 387-88 (1936).
51. Leavy, Criminal Abortion: Facing the Facts, 34 L.A. BAR BULL. 356 (1959).
52. For an analysis of criminal abortion in nine U.E. cities, see Sontheimer, Abortion in
America Today, Woman's Home Companion, Oct. 1955, p. 44.
53. For an extensive discussion of the complete workings of an abortion system, see Bates,
The Abortion Mill: An Institutional Study, 45 J. CRIM. L., C.&P.S. 157 (1954).
54. See account of Dr. Timanus in ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATEs 62-63 (Calderone ed.
1958), describing twenty years of illegal abortion practice.
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The appalling consequences of criminal and self-induced abortion are
reflected in the number of deaths resulting from abortion in this coun-
try. It is estimated that attempted criminal abortions result in the death
of between 5,000 and 10,000 women annually.55 Assuming 8,000
deaths and 700,000 operations performed, this would make one death
for each 87 abortions.56 This figure may be compared with the position
in Russia between 1920 and 1936, when abortion was legal and per-
formed in hospitals by skilled physicians. It is said that the death rate
was only one in ten thousand cases."T "The difference in the mortality
rate would appear to be due primarily to the abortion laws, which pre-
vent the operation being performed under proper conditions and by
proper persons.""8  In both England and America therapeutic abortion
performed by experts in hospitals is not an abnormal risk; but when it
is performed by an unskilled abortionist, it not only can be gravely in-
jurious to health but often causes death.59
However, the law takes no heed of this waste of human life and
health; in fact, it encourages it through its apathy in enforcing the re-
pressive legislation in existence, and/or in not enacting a broader view
toward legalized abortion. This is dearly reflected in the extremely low
rate of prosecution and in the even lower rate of convictions of abortion-
ists. In 1944 only one hundred sixteen persons were convicted for il-
legal abortions in the twenty-four states reporting on this." The reason
for this is dear. Women are reluctant to speak out, since they feel grate-
ful to the person who relieved them of the unwanted burden, and such
cases are seldom even detected unless serious illness or death results.61
The women themselves are almost never prosecuted since their testimony
is needed to convict the professionals, and what jury would convict a
woman under a law designed to protect her? 2 Furthermore, police and
authorities often allow known abortionists to practice since it is felt that
55. Leavy, Criminal Abortion: Pacing the Pacts, 34 LA. BAR BULL. 357 (1959).
56. See WILLAimS 213.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid. Also see Kross, Abortion Problems Seen in Cimindl Courts, National Comm. on
Maternal Health, THE ABORTION PROBLEM 108 (1944), who states that the laws "have
brought about a situation where abortions, instead of being performed in hospitals by compe-
tent physicians under aseptic conditions, are now performed by women themselves, by in-
competent midwives, by doctors who even though they may be skilled, must operate with
secrecy... Ibid.
59. WILLIAMS 213.
60. GEBHARD, POMEROY, MARTIN & CHRISTENSON, PREGNANCY, BIRTH AND ABORTION
192 (1958). Also see ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES 36 (Calderone ed. 1958), which
states that between 1946 and 1953 only 136 cases of abortion were prosecuted in New York
County, "a small percentage of the abortions that obviously must occur in a county that had
411,413 births in the same seven year period." Ibid.
61. WILLIAMS 206-11.
62. Id. at 153.
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there is a need for their services."3 Therefore, a law is in force today
that is disregarded by doctors and law enforcers, and which creates a vast
social problem; in short, there is a widespread difference between our
overt culture as expressed in our laws, and our covert culture as ex-
pressed by what people actually do and think.64 As Dr. Taussig stated,
he knew "of no other instance in history in which there has been such
frank and universal disregard for a criminal law."65
THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST A LIBERAL ABORTION LAW
The main factor accounting for laws against abortion is an ethical
or religious objection. As the fetus develops, the greater portion of man-
kind develops a feeling of sympathy toward it, so that the subsequent de-
struction of it comes to be regarded by many as morally equivalent to
murder.66 Moreover, abortion is opposed by many on the ground that
it is a violation of the divine command "to be fruitful and multiply."6 7
On these religious grounds the Jewish scholars do not consider the
present law too liberal, and more than likely would not oppose a broaden-
ing of the legal exception to the abortion statute.6" Nor would Prot-
estantism be opposed to some extension of the law.69 However, the
Roman Catholic view is firmly opposed to any form of abortion.
Catholicism proclaims that any direct attack upon the fetus is mur-
der.7" The historical reason for Catholic opposition to abortion is that
it brings about death of the child without the benefit of baptism, thereby
condemning it to eternal punishment.7 The modern view of the Catho-
lic Church has been that the baby is a living entity at the moment of
conception and that, therefore, a subsequent abortion destroys human
life.72 A theory has been formulated, however, which might allow Cath-
olic doctors and patients to reach the same results as non-Catholics. This
is the doctrine of "double effect" (indirect killing) and is applied when
there are both good and bad consequences resulting from a single act. 3
It simply means that if the actor intends the good consequence and the
63. GEBHARD, POMEROY, MARTIN & CHRISTENSON, PREGNANCY, BIRTH AND ABORTION
192 (1958).
64. Ibid.
65. TAussIG, ABORTION, SPONTANEOUS AND INDUCED 403 (1936).
66. MODEL CODE § 207.11 comment at 148.
67. Ibid.
68. Leavy, Criminal Abortion: Facing the Facts, 34 L.A. BAR BULL. 360 (1959).
69. Ibid.
70. For a complete discussion of the Catholic viewpoint, and an effective challenge of it,
see WILLIAMS 192-206, 225-33.
71. Id. at 193.
72. Id. at 197.
73. Id. at 193, 200.
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bad one results as an incident, the act is not considered sinful. For exam-
ple, a physician could operate to remove a malignant ovarian tumor in a
pregnant woman, and the indirect death of the fetus would be inci-
dental. 4
When the operation can in some way be justified independently of the
concept of abortion there is only an "indirect killing" of the fetus, but
the doctrine can never apply where danger arises to the mother simply
because of pregnancy.75
This theory, however, is used very restrictively.
The viewpoint of a "killing" is usually answered thus: most abortion
spontaneous and induced - occurs prior to the fourth month of
pregnancy. This is before the fetus has become firmly implanted in the
womb, before it has taken on the recognizable features of humanity, and
well before it is capable of any movement.76 There seems to be a wide
difference between terminating the development of such a being, whose
chance of survival is still not definite, and the destroying of a viable fetus
of eight months.77 Futhermore, the repression of abortion has led to
the performance of the operation by incompetents, leading to many
deaths of the aborted women.
It should also be pointed out that the criminal law is imposed upon
believers and non-believers as well, and should be enacted with a view
toward humanity as a whole,78 and not be governed by a theological atti-
tude. Furthermore, the religious opinion assumes that we should always
legislate morality, but many moral attitudes are disputable and narrow
and should not be part of the law as applied to the whole of humanity."
The best solution seems to be:
Let any religious sect characterize abortion as a sin if it sees fit to do so,
and punish its members for this sin by censure or other ecclesiastical
punishment. But whether abortion is a crime is to be judged by worldly
considerations .... 80
More dearly, if members of the Catholic faith do not desire to be aborted
under the above circumstances, they need not be. However, the law
should not be such that others are made criminals or are denied the relief
of an abortion, when the public approves of a more liberal abortion law,
simply because a certain group opposes the general view. The imposi-
74. Leavy, Criminal Abortion: Facing the Facts, 34 L.A. BAR BULL. 373 (1959).
75. Ibid.
76. MODEL CODE § 207.11, comment at 149.
77. Ibid.
78. WILLAMs 229.
79. Id. at 232.
80. Id. at 233. Also see ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES 148 (Calderone ed. 1958):
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e.g., Mormon beliefs.
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tion of the moral attitudes of one sect upon the general public is no
more proper than would be a re-enactment of prohibition simply because
some group opposes drinking.
Another argument against liberalization of the abortion laws is that
it would be unjustified on medical grounds, i.e. that the abortion might
leave bad effects (physical and psychological). However, even though
it is conceded that the operation is undesirable in itself, it is to be re-
garded as the lesser evil under many circumstances.8 Furthermore, it is
not the legislature's function to prescribe what is good for the patient;
we are accorded liberty in respect to our own bodies, even the liberty to
abuse them. No one would consider that the law should tell us to keep
regular hours, etc., even though that would improve the health of many."2
It is also argued that legalized abortion would lead to an underpopu-
lation problem. This argument, if valid, would lead us to penalize not
only abortion, but contraception, emigration, and the unmarried state.'
Even if an adequate population is necessary, it must be shown that this
cannot be achieved without recourse to the criminal law. Further, the
argument certainly cannot be applied to unmarried women.
A statement often advanced is that a broader abortion law would be
a condoning of illicit intercourse and an encouragement of promiscuity.
This factor can hardly be a significant influence on the rate of illicit
sexuality in a society where contraceptives offer reasonable assurance
against the need for the unpleasant and expensive prospect of abortion.8"
If the argument be assumed valid, it would also require a prohibition of
contraception, and even a ban on the cure of venereal disease - because
fear of the disease is a potent check on promiscuity. 5 Moreover, this
argument, if accepted, is correct only when applied to illegitimate preg-
nancies, and the abortion problem is not limited to this area. In fact, it
is estimated that nine-tenths of criminal abortions occur among married
women with three or more children. s
CONCLUSION
As the abortion law exists today, its restrictive approach has had
startling results. Patients, socially, medically, and humanely worthy, are
denied relief. The medical profession is forced to circumvent the law.
Criminal abortionists are operating openly.
These results, coupled with the weight of public opinion, which fa-
81. Id. at 222.
82. Id. at 223.
83. Id. at 224.
84. MODEL CODE S 207.11, comment at 148-49.
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86. Id. at 224-25.
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